Picture this: you buy a (perfectly legal) machine M, buy some (perfectly legal) content C, and insert C in M for the purpose of playing it.
Content owner O doesn’t want you to make too many copies of C (cause you’re all supposed to be thieves, right?), so they have the bright idea of installing a piece of software S to control access to your content C on your machine M.
As they’re shy about it, they install S in such a way that you cannot see it easily.
Now bring up more mud: S uses hacker-level covert techniques to hide itself and is utterly broken, so that any clever pirate P can use it to install their own pirate software S’ on your machine M.
And, last but not least, removing S breaks M…well, that’s maybe not that bad as M was bound to be attacked in many ways via S, but still…M is supposed to be your machine and you paid for it right? Well, you even paid for C by the way…
The level of incompetence exposed in all this is hard to believe once you add O = global media company into the equation. Analyses like doxpara’s shows that Sony’s rootkit has caused at least several hundred thousands of computers to become infected by their software S (or should it be S**t?), and realistically much more than that.
This DRM junk shows that controlling software that’s out in the wild is hard, and is a perfect example of causing more harm to legal customers than helping anybody.
I don’t have an easy solution to the overall problem, but taking control of your customer’s equipment using broken hacker software is…well, I’m not going to write that here ;-)
Find less rantish info about this Sony rootkit story at: